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I. Introduction
According to one picture of practical reasoning, people are
decision-making animals, assessing the advantages and disadvantages
of proposed courses of action and choosing in accordance with that
assessment. This picture plays a familiar role in economics and
decision theory; in various forms, it is central to leading descriptions
of reasoning in law and politics.1 Even in psychology, where models
of bounded rationality are pervasive and where it is common to speak
of “satisficing” rather than optimizing, the deviations can be
understood only against the background of this picture.2
As many people have noticed, this understanding of practical
reasoning is quite inadequate.3 An important problem is that it
                                                
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence,
University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science.
** Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. We are grateful to Joshua Cohen, David Friedman,
Elizabeth Garrett, Saul Levmore, Avishai Margalit, Martha Nussbaum, Eric
Posner, Richard Posner, David Strauss, and two anonymous reviewers for
valuable comments on a previous draft; thanks too to participants in a faculty
workshop at the University of Nebraska.
1 Thus the most complete treatment of legal reasoning, Ronald Dworkin, Law’s
Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), deals well with the use
of precedent, but not at all with the use of strategies to simplify the burdens of
decision; this is a serious gap. Helpful discussions of aspects of that topic can
be found in Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 37-45 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2d ed. 1991) (discussing rules and exclusionary
reasons) and Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986)  (discussing analogies). In the political domain, see Yuen Foongh
Khong, Analogies At War (1992).
2 A prominent exception of George Ainslie, Picoeconomics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), but Ainslie’s focus is on precommitment,
only one of the set of solutions discussed here, and Ainslie does not clearly
distinguish between rules and other kinds of precommitment strategies.
3 See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments 36-53 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990): John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical
Review 64 (1955) 3-32; Edward McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice
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ignores the existence of simplifying strategies that people adopt well
before on-the-spot decisions must be made.4 Debates over rule
utilitarianism have of course emphasized the importance of these
strategies, and precommitments, plans, and rules have received
prominent attention from (among others) Jon Elster,5 Edward
McClennen,6 Richard Thaler,7 and Frederick Schauer.8 A central
point here is that people seek to overcome their own
shortcomings—calculative, moral or otherwise—by making some
meta-choice before the moment of ultimate decision. But there are
significant gaps in these discussions. They do not take sufficiently
seriously the reluctance of ordinary people and social institutions to
make on-the-spot decisions,9 and they offer a truncated and
                                                                                                               
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also the useful survey of a
number of treatments in McClennen at 219-238. Within economics, see, e.g.,
Thomas Schelling, “Enforcing Rules on Oneself,” 1 J L Econ. & Org. 357
(1985); Kaplow, supra note; Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics 77-90
(New York: Rusell Sage, 1993); Eric Rasmussen, “Managerial Conservatism
and Rational Information Acquisition,” Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 1: 175-202 (1992); Eric Rasmussen, Games and
Information 129 (Oxford: Blackwell 1994).
4 Mill himself emphasized the point; see John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays 151-53 (John Gray ed., Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991).
5 See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens pp. 36-47 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979).
6 See Edward McClennen, p. 50-85.
7 See Richard Thaler, supra note, at 77-90.
8 See Frederick Schauer, Playing By The Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), which contains useful institutional discussion,
particularly of the relationship between courts and legislatures. Conrad
Johnson, Moral Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), is
in some ways complementary, discussing the differences between decisions at
the legislative level and individual choices.
9 For example, Elster’s principal concern is with the particular problem of
weakness of will, see Ulysses and the Sirens, p. 37, which is important but, as we
will see, only one of a large number of grounds for second-order decisions.
Thaler and Schelling are similarly concerned with self-control problems.
McClennen’s principal interest is in dynamic consistency. See p. 219. Mill’s
brief but important discussion involves the cognitive demands of constant
calculation. See Mill, p. 152.
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undifferentiated sense of the range of potential strategies for
improving, or reducing the burdens, of first-order decisions. They do
not, for example, investigate why an agent might adopt a firm rule
or instead a soft presumption or a standard; nor do they deal with
choices between these options and delegating to others or
proceeding via small, reversible steps.10 The result is to give an
inadequate understanding of how agents and institutions do or
should proceed, and no real sense of the political, moral, and legal
issues involved.
By second-order decisions we refer to decisions about the
appropriate strategy for reducing the problems associated with
making a first-order decision. Second-order decisions thus involve
the strategies that people use in order to avoid getting into an
ordinary decision-making situation in the first instance. There are
important issues here about cognitive burdens and also about
responsibility, equality, and fairness. In law, for example, some judges
favor a second-order decision in favor of rules, on the ground that
rules promote predictability and minimize the burdens of subsequent
decisions. In politics, legislatures often adopt a second-order decision
in favor of a delegation to some third party, like an administrative
agency. But there are many alternative strategies, and serious ethical
and even democratic questions are raised by rule-bound decisions (as
opposed, for example, to small, reversible steps) and by delegations (as
opposed, for example, to rebuttable presumptions).
We aim here to clarify the choice among second-order
strategies. We do so by showing that these strategies differ in the
extent to which they produce mistakes and also in the extent to
which they impose informational, moral, and other burdens on the
agent and on others, either before the process of ultimate decision or
during the process of ultimate decision. We identify three especially
interesting kinds of cases. The first involves second-order decisions
                                                
10 Johnson, supra note, is typical in not exploring the second-order alternatives
to rules (such as presumptions) as ways of promoting consequentialist goals.
Elster offers illuminating discussions of some of these strategies, but separately
and in various places, without discussing how agents can and do choose
between them, and with little treatment of institutional questions. See Jon
Elster, Solomonic Judgments 36-45 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993) (discussing randomization; Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens pp. 36-47
(discussing precommitment, apparently via rules).
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that greatly reduce burdens at the time of ultimate decision, but
require considerable thinking in advance. Decisions of this kind,
which we call High-Low, may be difficult to make before the fact;
the question is whether the burdens are worth incurring in light of
the aggregate burdens, moral, cognitive, and otherwise, of second-
order and first-order decisions taken together. The second we call
Low-Low. Some second-order strategies impose little in the way of
decisional burdens either before or during the ultimate decision. This
is a great advantage, and a major question is whether the strategy in
question (consider a decision to flip a coin) produces too much
unfairness or too many mistakes. The third we call Low-High.
Some second-order strategies involve low ex-ante decisional burdens
for the agents themselves, at the cost of imposing possibly high
subsequent burdens on someone else to whom the first-order
decision is “exported”; a delegation of power to some trusted
associate, or to an authority, is the most obvious case.
By drawing on actual practices, individual and institutional, we
attempt to provide guidance for seeing when one or another strategy
will be chosen, when one or another makes best sense, and how
both rational and boundedly rational persons and institutions might
go about making the relevant choices.11 No particular strategy can be
said to be better in the abstract; but it is possible to identify, in the
abstract, the factors that push in favor of one or another strategy,
and also the contexts in which each approach makes sense.
We suggest, for example, that a second-order decision in favor
of firm rules (a form of High-Low) is appropriate when an agent
faces a large number of decisions with similar features and when
advance planning is especially important; in such cases, the crudeness
of rules is easily tolerated because of their overall advantages. By
contrast, a second-order decision in favor of small, reversible steps (a
form of Low-Low) is preferable when the agent lacks reliable
information and reasonably fears unanticipated bad consequences;
this point helps explain the method that is often at work among
common law courts (and argues against some of the critics of that
                                                
11 Of course second-order decisions might operate as a rational response, by
boundedly rational persons or institutions, to their own bounded rationality;
but such decisions might also suffer from bounded rationality and go wrong
because of cognitive or motivational problems. See below.
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method). A sensible agent will choose the alternative second-order
strategy of delegating to another person or institution (a form of
Low-High) when there is a special problem with assuming
responsibility—informational, moral, or otherwise—and when an
appropriate delegate, with sufficient time and expertise, turns out to
be available; this point helps illuminate debates over delegations
within the family and from legislatures to administrative agencies.12
In the process we address a range of ethical, political, and legal issues
that are raised by various second-order decisions.
II. Decisions and Mistakes
A. Strategies
The following catalogue captures the major second-order
strategies. The taxonomy is intended to be exhaustive of the
possibilities, but the various items should not be seen as exclusive of
one another; there is some overlap between them.
Rules. People anticipating hard or repetitive decisions may do
best to adopt a rule. A key feature of a rule is that it amounts to a
full, or nearly full, ex ante specification of results in individual cases.
People might say, for example, that they will never cheat on their
taxes or fail to meet a deadline. A legislature might provide that
judges can never make exceptions to the speed-limit law or the law
banning dogs from restaurants, or that everyone who has been
convicted of three felonies must be sentenced to life imprisonment
Presumptions. Sometimes ordinary people and public
institutions rely not on a rule but instead on a presumption, which
can be rebutted. The result, it is hoped, is to make fewer mistakes
while at the same time incurring reasonable decisional burdens.13 An
                                                
12 Of course self-interested participants in politics will attempt to exploit
arguments of this kind in order to produce their preferred outcome. An
industry representation nervous about its chances of success in the legislature
might argue strongly on behalf of a delegation, in the hopes that the delegate
will be more receptive to its arguments (or more vulnerable to its influence).
We deal only in passing with the strategic considerations involved in second-
order strategies; this is a fertile area for further work, both empirical and
theoretical.
13 It is important here to distinguish between a presumption and a rule-with-
exceptions. A rule with exceptions has the following structure: “Do X—except
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administrative agency might presume, for example, that no one may
emit more than X tons of a certain pollutant, but the presumption
can be rebutted by showing that further reductions are not feasible.
Standards. Rules are often contrasted with standards.14 A ban
on “excessive” speed on the highway is a standard; so is a requirement
that pilots of airplanes be “competent,” or that student behavior in
the classroom be “reasonable.” These might be compared with rules
specifying a 55 mph speed limit, or a ban on pilots who are over the
age of 70, or a requirement that students sit in assigned seats.
Routines. Sometimes a reasonable way to deal with a decisional
burden is to adopt a routine. By this term we mean something
similar to a habit, but more voluntary, more self-conscious, and
without the pejorative connotations of some habits (like the habit of
chewing one’s fingernails). Thus a forgetful person might adopt a
routine of locking his door every time he leaves his office, even
though sometimes he knows he will return in a few minutes; thus a
commuter might adopt a particular route and follow it every day,
even though on some days another route would be better.
Small steps. A possible way of simplifying a difficult situation at
the time of choice is to make a small, incremental decision, and to
leave other questions for another day. When a personal decision
involves imponderable and apparently incommensurable elements,
people often take small, reversible steps first.15 For example, Jane may
                                                                                                               
in circumstances A, in which case you are exempt from doing X.” For example,
“observe the speed limit—except when you’re driving a police car or an
ambulance in an emergency, in which cases you may exceed it.” By contrast, a
typical presumption says something like: “Act on the assumption that
P—unless and until circumstances A are shown to obtain, in which case, do
something else.” The two amount to the same thing when the agent knows
whether or not circumstances A obtain. The two are quite different when the
agent lacks that information. With a presumption, you can proceed without the
information; with a rule-with-exceptions, you cannot proceed, that is, you are
justified neither in doing X nor in not doing X. See Edna Ullmann-Margalit,
“On Presumption,” J.Phil 80: 143-162 (1983).
14 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, “Rules and Standards: An Economic Analysis,”
Duke L.J. 42 (1992): 189-221; Kathleen Sullivan, “Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards,” Harv. L. Rev. 105 (1993): 22-103.
15 See Edna Ullmann-Margalit, “Opting: The Case of ‘Big’ Decisions,” in The
1985 Yearbook of the Wissenschaftkeleg Zu Berlin.
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decide to live with Robert before she decides whether she wants to
marry him; Marilyn may go to night school to see if she is really
interested in law. A similar “small steps” approach is the hallmark of
Anglo-American common law.16 Judges typically make narrow
decisions, resolving little beyond the individual case; at least this is
their preferred method of operation when they are not quite
confident about the larger issues, not only in the common law but in
constitutional law too.17
Picking. Sometimes the difficulty of decision, or symmetry
among the options, pushes people to decide on a random basis. They
might, for example, flip a coin, or make some apparently irrelevant
factor decisive (“it’s a sunny day, so I’ll take that job in Florida”).
Thus they might “pick” rather than “choose” (taking the latter term
to mean basing a decision on preference).18 A legal system might use
a lottery to decide who serves on juries or in the military, and indeed
lotteries are used in many domains where the burdens of
individualized choice are high, and when there is some particular
problem with deliberation about the grounds of choice, sometimes
because of apparent symmetries among the candidates.
                                                
16 See Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 3- 15 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1948). In political science, see Charles
Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through,” 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79
(1955), which offers an influential and relevant argument about
incrementalism. See also Charles Lindblom, “Still Muddlin, Not Yet
Through,” Public Administration Review 39 (1979): 517-26. Lindblom’s
discussion is in the same general family as our exploration of small steps,
though (oddly) Lindblom does not discuss the judiciary, and he does not
explore when other second-order stategies might be preferable.
17 Thus in cases involving the right to die, affirmative action, and sex equality,
Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg much favor small
steps as the strategy of choice; this is the ground on which they tend to
disagree with Justice Scalia, and in fact it counts as the leading jurisprudential
dispute on the current Supreme Court The tension between the rule of law and
the common law method is the basic theme of Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation 5-15 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). For general
discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time: Judicial Minimalism on
the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
18 See Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Sidney Morgenbesser, “Picking and
Choosing,” Social Research 44 (1977): 757-83.
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Delegation. A familiar way of handling decisional burdens is to
delegate the decision to someone else. People might, for example,
rely on a spouse or a friend, or choose an institutional arrangement
by which certain decisions are made by authorities established at the
time or well in advance. Such arrangements can be more or less
formal; they involve diverse mechanisms of control, or entirely
relinquished control, by the person or people for whose benefit they
have been created.
Heuristics. People often use heuristic devices, or mental short-
cuts, as a way of bypassing the need for individualized choice. For
example, it can be overwhelming to figure out for whom to vote in
local elections; people may therefore use the heuristic of party
affiliation. When meeting someone new, your behavior may be a
result of heuristic devices specifying the appropriate type of behavior
with a person falling in the general category in which the new
person seems to fall. A great deal of attention has been given to
heuristic devices said to produce departures from “rationality.”19 But
often heuristic devices are fully rational, if understood as a way of
producing pretty good outcomes while at the same time reducing
cognitive overload or other decisional burdens.
B. Costs of Decisions and Costs of Errors
Under what circumstances will, or should, an agent or
institution make some second-order decision rather than making an
all-things-considered judgment on the spot? And under what
circumstances will, or should, one or another strategy be chosen?
Many people have emphasized the particular value of rules, which
can overcome myopia or weakness of will20; but the problem is far
more general, and rules are just one of many possible solutions. Our
ultimate goal is to suggest the most promising contexts for the
principal candidates, especially rules, small steps, and delegation.
We have said that second-order strategies differ in the extent to
which they produce mistakes and decisional burdens. In what
follows we shall suggest that second-order strategies should be
                                                
19 See, e.g., John Conlisk, “Why Bounded Rationality?,” J. Econ. Lit. 34
(1996): 669-698.
20 See the discussion of precommitment in Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens, and the
treatment of “resolute choice” in McClennen.
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chosen by attempting to minimize the sum of the costs of making
decisions and the costs of error, where the costs of making decisions
are the costs of coming to closure on some action or set of actions,
and where the costs of error are assessed by examining the number,
the magnitude, and the kinds of mistakes.21 We understand “errors”
as suboptimal outcomes, whatever the criteria for deciding what is
optimal; thus both rules and delegations can produce errors (the rule
may be crude; the delegate may be incompetent). If the costs of
producing optimal decisions were zero, it would be best to make
individual calculations in each case, for this approach would produce
correct judgments without compromising accuracy or any other
important value. This would be true for individual agents and also
for institutions. It is largely because people (including public officials)
seek to reduce decisional burdens, and to minimize their own errors,
that sometimes they would like not to have options and sometimes
not to have information; and they may make second-order decisions
to reduce either options or information (or both).22
Three additional points are necessary here. The first involves
responsibility: people sometimes want to assume responsibility for
certain decisions even if others would make those decisions better,
and people sometimes want to relieve themselves of responsibility for
certain decisions even if other people would make those decisions
worse. These are familiar phenomena in daily life; so too in politics
and law, where people with authority encounter formal and
informal barriers to their own efforts to delegate. A failure of
                                                
21 Kaplow illuminatingly uses a framework of this sort, but in a way that seems
to us too reductionistic. Schauer, pp. 196-206, recognizes that the case for rules
depends on empirical considerations. The treatments of precommitment in
Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens, and Schelling do not explore the circumstances in
which a rule-bound strategy is preferable to some other (second-order)
approach, nor do they explore the grounds for choice among the various
second-order strategies discussed here. In general, existing treatments of
precommitment tend to ambiguous about whether the relevant strategy is a rule
or something else. See, e.g., Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens, at 37-40
(collecting heterogeneous illustrations).
22 See Edna Ullmann-Margalit, “On Not Wanting To Know,” in Reasoning
Practically (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 1999); Gerald
Dworkin, “Is More Choice Better Than Less?”, in Autonomy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991).
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responsibility might be understand as a kind of “cost,” but it is
qualitatively different from the decision costs and error costs
discussed thus far, and raises separate questions. Special issues are
created by institutional arrangements that divide authority, such as
the separation of powers; such arrangements forbid people from
assuming or delegating certain decisions, even if they would very
much like to do so.
The second point comes from the fact that multi-party
situations raise distinctive problems. Above all, public institutions
(including legislatures, agencies, and courts) may seek to promote
planning by setting down rules and presumptions in advance. The
need for planning can argue strongly against on-the-spot decisions
even if they would be both correct and costless to achieve. As we will
see, the need for planning can lead in the direction of a particular
kind of second-order strategy, one that makes on-the-spot decisions
more or less mechanical.
The third and most important point is that a reference to a
“sum” of decision costs and error costs should not be taken to suggest
that a straightforward cost-benefit analysis is an adequate way to
understand the choice among second-order strategies. Of course
there is no simple metric along which to align the various
considerations. Important qualitative differences can be found
between decision costs and error costs, among the various kinds of
decision costs, and also among the various kinds of error costs. Thus
for any agent the costs of decision may include time, money,
unpopularity, anxiety, boredom, agitation, anticipated ex post regret
or remorse, feelings of responsibility for harm done to self or others,
injury to self-perception, guilt, or shame. We refer to decision costs
and error costs in order to start with a relatively simple framework;
additional considerations will be introduced as the discussion
proceeds.
Things become differently complicated for multimember
institutions, where these points also apply, but where interest-group
pressures may be important, and where there is the special problem
of reaching a degree of consensus. A legislature, for example, might
find it especially difficult to specify the appropriate approach to
global warming, given the problems posed by disagreement, varying
intensity of preference, and aggregation issues; for similar reasons a
multimember court may have a hard time agreeing on how to
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handle an asserted right to physician-assisted suicide. The result may
be strategies for delegation or for deferring decision, often via small
steps.
An institution facing political pressures may have a distinctive
reason to adopt a particular kind of second-order decision, one that
will deflect responsibility for choice. Jean Bodin defended the creation
of an independent judiciary, and thus provided an initial insight into
a system of separated and divided powers, on just this ground; a
monarch is relieved of responsibility for unpopular but indispensable
decisions if he can point to a separate institution that has been
charged with the relevant duty.23 This is an important kind of
enabling constraint, characteristic of good second-order decisions. In
modern states, the existence of an independent central bank is often
justified on this ground. In the United States, the President has no
authority over the money supply and indeed no authority over the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, partly on the theory that
this will prevent the President from being criticized for necessary but
unpopular decisions (such as refusing to increase the supply of money
when unemployment seems too high); the fact that the Federal
Reserve Board is unelected is an advantage here. There are analogues
in business, in workplaces, and even in families, where a mother or
father may be given the responsibility for making certain choices,
partly in order to relieve the other of responsibility. Of course this
approach can cause problems of fairness, equality, and mistake.
C. Burdens Ex Ante and Burdens On-the-Spot
The inquiry into second-order strategies might be organized by
noticing a simple point: Some such strategies require substantial
thought in advance but little thought on-the-spot, whereas others
require little thought before the situation of choice arises and also
little thought on-the-spot. Stlll others involve little ex-ante thought,
which leads to imposing the possibly high decisional burdens on
others. Thus there is a temporal difference in the imposition of the
burdens of decision, which we describe with the terms “High-Low,”
“Low-Low,” and “Low-High.” To fill out the possibilities, we add
                                                
23 See Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996).
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“High-High” as well. By the term decision costs we refer to the
overall costs, which may be borne by different people or agencies: the
work done before the fact of choice may not be carried out by the
same actors who will have to do the thinking during the ultimate
choice. Consider Table 1:
Table 1: Burdens Ex Ante and Burdens On the Spot
little ex ante
thinking
Substantial ex ante
thinking
little on-the-spot
thinking
Low-Low:
picking; small
steps; various
heuristics; some
standards (1)
High-Low:
rules; presumptions; some
standards; routines (2)
Substantial on-
the-spot
thinking
Low-High:
delegation (3)
High-High:
some characters in Henry
James novels;
dysfunctional
governments (4)
Cell 1 captures strategies that promise to minimize the overall
burdens of having to make decisions (whether or not they promote
good overall decisions). These are cases in which agents do not
invest a great deal of thought either before or at the time of decision.
Picking is the most obvious case; consider the analogous possibility
of flipping a coin. Small steps are more demanding, since the agent
does have to make some decisions, but because the steps are small,
there need be comparatively little thought before or during the
decision. The most sharply contrasting set of cases is High-High,
Cell (4). As this cell captures strategies that maximize overall decision
costs, it ought for our purposes to remain empty, or at least nearly so.
Fortunately it seems to be represented only by a small minority of
people in actual life. Often those who fall in Cell (4) seem hopelessly
indecisive, but it is possible to imagine people thinking that High-
High represents a norm of moral responsibility, or that (as some
people seem to think) incurring high burdens of decision is
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something to relish. It is also possible to urge High-High where the
issue is extremely important and where there is no other way of
ensuring accuracy; consider, for example, the decision when to
terminate a war, a decision that may reasonably call for a great deal
of deliberation both before and during the period of choice.
Cell (2) captures a common aspiration for national legislatures
and for ordinary agents who prefer their lives to be rule-bound.
Some institutions and agents spend a great deal of time choosing the
appropriate rules; but once the rules are in place, decisions become
extremely simple, rigid, even mechanical. Everyone knows people of
this sort; they can seem both noble and frustrating precisely because
they follow rules to the letter. Legal formalism—the commitment to
setting out clear rules in advance and mechanical decision afterwards,
a commitment defended by Supreme Court Justices Hugo Black and
Antonin Scalia—is associated with cell (2).24
When planning is important and when a large number of
decisions must be made, cell (2) is often the best approach, as the
twentieth-century movement away from the common law, and
toward bureaucracy and simple rules, helps to confirm. Individual
cases of unfairness may be tolerable if the overall result is to prevent
the system from being overwhelmed by decisional demands. Cell (2)
is also likely to be the best approach when many people are involved
and it is known in advance that the people who will have to carry
out on-the-spot decisions constantly change. Consider institutions
with many employees and a large turnover (the army, entry levels of
large corporations, and so forth). The head of an organization may
not want newly recruited, less-than-well-trained people to make
decisions for the firm: rules should be in place so as to insure
continuity and uniform level of performance. On the other hand,
the fact that life will confound the rules often produces arguments
for institutional reform in the form of granting power to
administrators or employees to exercise “common sense” in the face
of rules.25 An intermediate case can be found with most standards;
the creation of the standard may itself require substantial thinking,
                                                
24 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation pp. 5-20.
25 See Phillip Howard, The Death of Common Sense 12-51 (New York: Warner
Books, 1996).
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but even when the standard is in place, agents may have to do some
deliberating in order to reach closure.
Cell (3) suggests that institutions and individuals sometimes do
little thinking in advance but may or may not minimize the
aggregate costs of decision. The best case for this approach involves
an agent who lacks much information or seeks for some other
reason to avoid responsibility, and a delegate who promises to make
good decisions relatively easily. As we have seen, delegations may
require little advance thinking, at least on the substance of the issues
to be decided; the burdens of decision will eventually be faced by the
object of the delegation. Of course while some delegations are
almost automatic (say, in a family), some people think long and hard
about whether and to whom to delegate. Also, some people who
have been delegated power will proceed by rules, presumptions,
standards, small steps, picking, or even subdelegations. Note that
small steps might be seen as an effort to “export” the costs of decision
to one’s future self; this is related to an important theme in the
common law, and an aspect that is highly valued by many judges.
It is an important social fact that many people are relieved of
the burdens of decision through something other than their own
explicit wishes. Consider prisoners, the mentally handicapped, young
children, or (at some times and places) women; in a range of cases,
society or law makes a second-order decision on someone else’s
behalf, often without any indication of that person’s own desires.
The usurpation of another’s decisions, or second-order decisions, is
often based on a belief that the relevant other will systematically err.
This of course relates to the notion of paternalism, which can be
seen as frequently arising when there is delegation without consent.
In some cases, second-order decisions produce something best
described as Medium-Medium, with imaginable extensions toward
Moderately High-Moderately Low, and Moderately Low-
Moderately High. As examples consider some standards, which, it
will be recalled, structure first-order decisions but require a degree of
work on the spot, with the degree depending on the nature of the
particular standard. But after understanding the polar cases, analysis
of these intermediate cases is straightforward, and hence we will not
undertake that analysis here.
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We now turn to the contexts in which agents and institutions
will, or should, follow one or another of the basic second-order
strategies.
III. Low-High
(with Special Reference to Delegation)
A. Informal and Formal Delegations
As a first approximation, a delegation is a second-order strategy
that exports decision-making burdens to someone else, in an effort
to reduce the agent’s burdens both before and at the time of making
the ultimate decision. A typical case involves an agent who seeks to
avoid responsibility (for some strategic or ethical reason, or because of
a simple lack of information) and who identifies an available delegate
whom he trusts to make a good, right, or expert decision.
Informal delegations occur all the time. Thus, for example, one
spouse may delegate to another the decision about what the family
will eat for dinner, what investments to choose, or what car to buy.
Such delegations often occur because the burdens of decision are
high for the agent but low for the delegate, who may have
specialized information, who may lack relevant biases or motivational
problems, or who may not mind (and who may even enjoy) taking
responsibility for the decision in question. (These cases may then be
more accurately captured as special cases of Low-Low.) The intrinsic
burdens of having to make the decision are often counterbalanced by
the benefits of having been asked to assume responsibility for it
(though these may be costs rather than benefits in some cases). Thus
some delegates are glad to assume their role; this is important to,
though it is not decisive for, the ethical issue whether to delegate
(consider the question of justice within the family). And there is an
uneasy line, raising knotty conceptual and empirical questions,
between a delegation and a division of labor (consider the allocation
of household duties). A key issue here is whether the recipient of the
delegation has the authority to decline.
Government itself is a large recipient of delegated decisions, at
least if sovereignty is understood to lie in the citizenry. On this view,
various public institutions–-legislatures, courts, the executive
branch–-exercise explicitly or implicitly delegated authority, and
there are numerous subdelegations, especially for the legislature,
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which must relieve itself of many decisional burdens. A legislature
may delegate because it believes that it lacks information about, for
example, environmental problems or changes in the
telecommunications market; the result is an Environmental
Protection Agency or a Federal Communications Commission. Or
the legislature may have the information but find itself unable to
forge a consensus on underlying values about, for example, the right
approach to affirmative action or to age discrimination.
Often a legislature lacks the time and the organization to make
the daily decisions that administrative agencies are asked to handle;
consider the fact that legislatures that attempt to reconsider agency
decisions often find themselves involved in weeks or even months of
work, and fail to reach closure. Or the legislature may be aware that
its vulnerability to interest-group pressures will lead it in bad
directions, and it may hope and believe that the object of the
delegation will be relatively immune. Interest-group pressures may
themselves produce a delegation, as where powerful groups are
unable to achieve a clear victory in a legislature but are able to obtain
a grant of authority to an administrative agency over which they will
have power. The legislature may even want to avoid responsibility for
some hard choice, fearing that decisions will produce electoral
reprisal. Self-interested representatives may well find it in their
electoral self-interest to enact a vague or vacant standard (“the public
interest,” “reasonable accommodation” of the disabled, “reasonable
regulation” of pesticides), and to delegate the task of specification to
someone else, secure in the knowledge that the delegate will be
blamed for problems in implementation.
B. When to Delegate
Delegation deserves to be considered whenever an appropriate
and trustworthy delegate is available and there is some sense in
which it seems undesirable for the agent to be making the decision
by himself. But obviously delegation can be a mistake—an abdication
of responsibility, an act of unfairness, a recipe for more rather than
fewer errors, for even higher (aggregate) costs of decision. And since
delegation is only one of a number of second-order strategies, an
agent should usually consider other possibilities before delegating.
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Compared to a High-Low approach, a delegation will be
desirable if the legislature, or the delegator, is unable to generate a
workable rule or presumption (and if anything it could come up with
would be costly to produce) and if a delegate would therefore do
better on the merits. This may be the case on a multimember body
that is unable to reach agreement, or when an agent or institution
faces a cognitive or motivational problem, such as weakness of will or
susceptibility to outside influences. A delegation will also be favored
over High-Low if the delegator seeks to avoid responsibility for the
decision for political, social, or other reasons, though the effort to
avoid responsibility may also create problems of legitimacy, as when a
legislator relies on “experts” to make value judgments about
environmental protection or disability discrimination.
As compared with small steps or picking, a delegation may or
may not produce higher total decision costs (perhaps the delegate is
slow or a procrastinator). Even if the delegation does produce higher
total decision costs, it may also lead to more confidence in the
eventual decisions, at least if reliable delegates are available. In the
United States, for example, the Federal Reserve Board has a high
degree of public respect and hence there is little pressure to eliminate
or reduce the delegation. But a delegate—a friend, a spouse, an
Environmental Protection Agency—may prove likely to err, and a
rule, a presumption, or small steps may emerge instead. Special issues
are raised in technical areas, which create strong arguments for
delegation, but where the delegate’s judgments may be hard to
oversee (even if they conceal controversial judgments of value; return
to the EPA26).
There is also the independent concern for fairness. In some
circumstances, it is unfair to delegate to, for example, a friend or a
spouse the power of decision, especially but not only because the
delegate is not a specialist. Issues of gender equality arise when a
husband delegates to his wife all decisions involving the household
and the children, even if both husband and wife agree on the
delegation. Apart from this issue, a delegation by one spouse to
another may well seem inequitable if (say) it involves a child’s
                                                
26 This is the basic theme of Marc Roberts et al., The Environmental Protection
Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2d ed.
1996).
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problems with alcohol, because it is an abdication of responsibility, a
way of transferring the burdens of decision to someone else who
should not be forced to bear them alone.
In institutional settings, there is an analogous problem if the
delegate (usually an administrative agency) lacks political
accountability even if it has relevant expertise. The result is the
continuing debate over the legitimacy of delegations to
administrative agencies.27 Such delegations can be troublesome if
they shift the burden of judgment from a democratically elected
body to one that is insulated from political control. What we are
adding here is that the longstanding debate over delegations offers a
far too limited sense of the alternatives. A legislature is not
confronted only with the choice whether or not to delegate; if the
legislature wants to avoid the degree of specificity entailed by rule-
bound law, it might instead enact a presumption or take small steps
(as, for example, through an experimental pilot program). Related
issues are raised by the possibly illegitimate abdication of authority
when a judge delegates certain powers to law clerks (as is occasionally
alleged about Supreme Court justices) or to special masters who are
expert in complex questions of fact and law (as was alleged in
connection with a delegation of factfinding power to a prominent
law professor in the Microsoft litigation, a delegation that was
ultimately ruled invalid).
C. Complications
Three important complications deserve comment. First, any
delegate may itself resort to making second-order decisions, and it is
familiar to find delegates undertaking each of the strategies that we
have described. Sometimes delegates prefer High-Low and hence
generate rules; almost everyone knows that this is the typical strategy
of the Internal Revenue Service. Alternatively, delegates may use
standards or proceed by small steps. This is the general approach of
the National Labor Relations Board, which (strikingly) avoids rules
whenever it can, and much prefers to proceed case-by-case. Or a
delegate may undertake a subdelegation. Confronted with a
                                                
27 Compare David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1995) with Jerry Mashaw, Chaos, Greed, and Governance
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
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delegation from her husband, a wife may consult a sibling or a
parent. Asked by Congress to make hard choices, the President may
and frequently does subdelegate to some kind of commission, for
some of the same reasons that spurred Congress to delegate in the
first instance. Of course a delegate may just pick.
The second complication is that the control of a delegate
presents a potentially serious principal-agent problem. How can the
person who has made the delegation ensure that the delegate will
not make serious and numerous mistakes, or instead fritter away its
time trying to decide how to decide? There are multiple possible
mechanisms of control. Instead of giving final and irreversible
powers of choice to the delegate, a person or institution might turn
the delegate into a mere consultant or advice-giver. A wide range of
intermediate relationships is possible. In the governmental setting, a
legislature can influence the ultimate decision by voicing its concerns
publicly if an administrative agency is heading in the wrong
direction, and the legislature has the power to overturn an
administrative agency if it can muster the will to do so. Ultimately
the delegator may retain the power to eliminate the delegation, and
to ensure against (what the delegator would consider to be) mistakes,
it may be sufficient for the delegate to know this fact. In informal
relations, involving friends, colleagues, and family members, there
are various mechanisms for controlling any delegate. Some
“delegates” know that they are only consultants; others know that
they have the effective power of decision. All this happens through a
range of cues, which may be subtle.
The third complication stems from the fact that at the outset,
the burdens of a second-order decision of this kind may not be so
low after all, since the person or institution must take the time to
decide whether to delegate at all and if so, to whom to delegate.
Complex issues may arise about the composition of any institution
receiving the delegation; these burdens may be quite high and
perhaps decisive against delegation altogether. A multimember
institution often divides sharply on whether to delegate and even
after that decision is made, it may have trouble deciding on the
recipient of the delegated authority.
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D. Intrapersonal Delegations and Delegation to Chance
Thus far we have been discussing cases in which the delegator
exports the burdens of decision to some other party. What about the
intrapersonal case? On the one hand, there is no precise analogy
between that problem and the cases under discussion. On the other
hand, people confronted with hard choices can often be understood
to have chosen to delegate the power of choice to their future selves.
Consider, for example, such decisions as whether to buy a house, to
have another child, to get married or divorced, to move to a new city;
in such cases agents who procrastinate may understand themselves to
have delegated the decision to their future selves.
There are two possible reasons for this kind of intrapersonal
delegation, involving timing and content respectively. You may
believe you know what the right decision is, but also believe it is not
the right time to be making that decision, or at least not the right
time to announce it publicly. Alternatively, you may not know what
the right decision is and believe that your future self will be in a
better position to decide. You may think that your future self will
have more information, suffer less or not at all from cognitive
difficulties, bias, or motivational problems, or be in a better position
to assume the relevant responsibility. Perhaps you are feeling under
pressure, suffering from illness, or not sure of your judgment just yet.
In such cases, the question of intrapersonal, intertemporal choice is
not so far from the problem of delegation to others. It is even
possible to see some overlapping principal-agent problems with
similar mechanisms of control, as people impose certain constraints
on their future selves. There are close parallels for judges and
legislators, who care a great deal about both timing and content, and
who may wait for one or another reason.
From the standpoint of the agent, then, the strategy of small
steps, like delay, can be seen as a form of delegation. Also, the
strategy of delegation itself may turn into that of picking when the
delegate is a chance device. When I make my future decision depend
on which card I draw from my deck of cards, I’ve delegated my
decision to the random card-drawing mechanism, thereby effectively
turning my decision from choosing to picking.
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IV. High-Low
(with Special Reference to Rules and Presumptions)
We have seen that people often make second-order decisions
that are themselves costly, simply in order to reduce the burdens of
later decisions in particular cases. This is the most conventional kind
of precommitment strategy.28 The most promising setting for rule-
bound precommitment involves a large number of similar decisions
and a need for advance planning (as opposed to improvisation). In
such a setting, the occasional errors inevitably produced by rules are
likely to be worth incurring. When this process is working well,
there is much to do before the second-order decision has been made,
but once the decision is in place, things are greatly simplified.29
A. Diverse Rules, Diverse Presumptions
We have suggested that rules and presumptions belong in the
High-Low category, and frequently this is true. But the point must
be qualified; some rules and presumptions do not involve high
burdens of decision before the fact. For example, a rule might be
picked rather than chosen—drive on the right-hand side of the road,
or spoons to the right, forks to the left. Especially when what it is
important is to allow all actors to coordinate on a single course of
conduct, there need be little investment in decisions about the
content of the relevant rule. A rule might even be framed narrowly,
so as to work as a kind of small step. A court might decide, for
example, that a law excluding homosexuals from the armed services is
unconstitutional, and this decision might be framed as a rule; but the
court’s opinion could be issued in such a way as to leave undecided
most other issues involving the constitutional status of homosexuals.
Rules often embody small steps. Of course the same points can be
made about presumptions, which are sometimes picked rather than
chosen and which might be quite narrow.
                                                
28 See, e.g., Elster; Schauer.
29 See, e.g., Elster and Schelling, who see that precommitment strategies are
often appropriate, but who do not discuss the choice between rules and
alternative candidates, or whether some other second-order strategy might be
better.
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For present purposes we focus on situations in which an
institution or an agent is willing to deliberate a good deal to generate
a rule or a presumption that, once in place, turns out greatly to
simplify (without impairing and perhaps even improving) future
decisions. This is a familiar aspiration in law and politics. A
legislature might, for example, decide in favor of a speed limit law,
partly in order to ensure coordination among drivers, and partly as a
result of a process of balancing various considerations about risks and
benefits. People are especially willing to expend a great deal of effort
to generate rules in two circumstances: (1) when planning and fair
notice are important and (2) when a large number of decisions will
be made.30
In most well-functioning legal systems, for example, it is clear
what is and what is not a crime. People need to know when they
may be subject to criminal punishment for what they do. In theory
if not in practice, the American Constitution is taken to require a
degree of clarity in the criminal law, and every would-be tyrant
knows that rules may be irritating constraints on his authority. So
too, the law of contract and property is mostly defined by clear rules,
simply because people could not otherwise plan, and in order for
economic development to be possible they need to be in a position to
do so. When large numbers of decisions have to be made, there is a
similar tendency to spend a great deal of time to clarify outcomes in
advance. In the United States, the need to make a large number of
decisions has pushed the legal system into the development of rules
governing social security disability, workers’ compensation, and
criminal sentencing. The fact that these rules produce a significant
degree of error is not decisive; the sheer cost of administering the
relevant systems, with so massive a number of decisions, makes a
certain number of errors tolerable.
Compared to rules, standards and “soft” presumptions serve to
reduce the burdens of decision ex ante while increasing those
burdens at the time of decision. This is both their virtue and their
vice. Consider, for example, the familiar strategy of enacting rigid,
rule-like environmental regulations while at the same time allowing
a “waiver” for special circumstances. The virtue of this approach is
                                                
30 See Louis Kaplow, “Rules and Standards: An Economic Analysis,” 42 Duke
LJ (1992, supra.
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that the rigid rules will likely produce serious mistakes—high costs,
low environmental benefits—in some cases; the waiver provision
allows correction in the form of an individualized assessment of
whether the statutory presumption should be rebutted. The
potential vice of this approach is that it requires a fair degree of
complexity in a number of individual cases. Whether the complexity
is worthwhile turns on a comparative inquiry with genuine rules.
How much error would be produced by the likely candidates? How
expensive is it to correct those errors by turning the rules into
presumptions?
B. Of Institutions, Planning, and Trust
Often institutions are faced with the decision whether to adopt
a High-Low strategy or instead to delegate. We have seen contexts
in which a delegation is better. But in three kinds of circumstances
the High-Low approach is to be preferred. First, when planning is
important, it is important to set out rules (or presumptions) in
advance. The law of property is an example. Second, there is little
reason to delegate when the agent or institution has a high degree of
confidence that a rule (or presumption) can be generated at
reasonable cost, that the rule (or presumption) will be accurate, and
that it will actually be followed. Third, and most obviously, High-
Low is better when no trustworthy delegate is available, or when it
seems unfair to ask another person or institution to make the
relevant decision. Liberal democracies take these considerations as
special reasons to justify rules in the context of criminal law: The law
defining crimes is reasonably rule-like, partly because of the
importance of citizen knowledge about what counts as a crime,
partly because of a judgment that police officers and courts cannot be
trusted to define the content of the law. Generally legislatures tend
in the direction of rule-like judgment when they have little
confidence in the executive; in America, parts of the Clean Air Act
are a prime example of a self-conscious choice of High-Low over
delegation.
When would High-Low be favored over Low-Low (picking,
small steps)? The interest in planning is highly relevant here and
often pushes in the direction of substantial thinking in advance. If
the agent or institution has faith in its ability to generate a good rule
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or presumption, it does not make much sense to proceed by random
choice or incrementally. Hence legislatures have often displaced the
common law approach of case-by-case judgment with clear rules set
out in advance. In England and America, this has been a great
movement of the twentieth century, largely because of the interest
in planning and decreased faith in the courts’ ability to generate
good outcomes through small steps. Of course mixed strategies are
possible. An institution may produce a rule to cover certain cases but
delegate decision in other cases; or a delegate may be disciplined by
presumptions and standards; or an area of law, or practical reason,
may be covered by some combination of rule-bound judgment and
small steps.
C. Private Decisions: Ordinary People, Intrapersonal Collective Action
Problems, and Recovering Addicts
Thus far we have been stressing public decisions. In their
individual capacity, people frequently adopt rules, presumptions, or
self-conscious routines in order to guide decisions that they know
might, in individual cases, be too costly to make or be made
incorrectly because of their own motivational problems. Sarah might
decide, for example, that she will turn down all invitations for out-
of-town travel in the month of September, or John might adopt a
presumption against going to any weddings or funerals unless they
involve close family members, or Fred might make up his mind that
at dinner parties, he will drink whatever the host is drinking. Rules,
presumptions, and routines of this kind are an omnipresent feature
of practical reason; sometimes they are chosen self-consciously and as
an exercise of will, but more often they are, or become, so familiar
and simple that they appear to the agent not to be choices at all.
Problems arise when a person finds that he cannot stick to his
resolution, and thus High-Low may turn into High-High, and
things may be as if the second-order decision had not been made at
all.
Some especially important cases involve efforts to solve the
kinds of intertemporal, intrapersonal problems that arise when
isolated, small-step first-order decisions are individually rational but
produce harm to the individual when taken in the aggregate. These
cases might be described as involving “intrapersonal collective action
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problems.”31 Consider, for example, the decision to smoke a cigarette
(right now), or to have chocolate cake for desert, or to have an
alcoholic drink after dinner, or to gamble on weekends. Small steps,
which are rational choices when taken individually and which
produce net benefits when taken on their own, can lead to harm or
even disaster when they accumulate. There is much room here for
second-order decisions. As a self-control strategy, a person might
adopt a rule: cigarettes only after dinner; no gambling, ever;
chocolate cake only on holidays; alcohol only at parties when
everyone else is drinking. But a presumption might work better – for
example, a presumption against chocolate cake, with the possibility
of rebuttal on special occasions, when celebration is in the air and
the cake looks particularly good.
Well-known private agencies designed to help people with self-
control problems (Alcoholics’ Anonymous, Gamblers’ Anonymous)
have as their business the development of second-order strategies of
this general kind. The most striking cases involve recovering addicts,
but people who are not addicts, and who are not recovering from
anything, often make similar second-order decisions. When self-
control is particularly difficult to achieve, an agent may seek to
delegate instead. Whether a delegation (Low-High) is preferable to
a rule or presumption (High-Low) will depend in turn on the
various considerations discussed above.
V. Low-Low
(with Special Reference to Picking and Small Steps)
A. Equipoise, Responsibility, and Commitment
Why might an institution or agent pick rather than choose?
When would small steps be best? At the individual level, it can be
obvious that when you are in equipoise, you might as well pick; it
simply is not worthwhile to go through the process of choosing,
with its high cognitive or emotional costs. As we have seen, the
result can be picking in both low-stakes (cereal choices) and high-
stakes (employment opportunities) settings. Picking can even be said
to operate as a kind of delegation, where the object of the delegation
                                                
31 Cf. Thomas Schelling, “Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a
Theory of Rational Choice,” Am. Econ. Rev. 74 (1984): 1-22.
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is “fate,” and the agent loses the sense of responsibility that might
accompany an all-things-considered judgment. Thus some people
sort out hard questions by resorting to a chance device (like flipping a
coin).
Small steps, unlike a random process, are a form of choosing.
Students in high schools tend to date in this spirit, at least most of
the time; often adults do too. Newspapers and magazines offer trial
subscriptions; the same is true for book clubs. Often advertisers (or
for that matter prospective romantic partners) know that people
prefer small steps and they take advantage of that preference (“no
commitments”). In the first years of university, students need not
commit themselves to any particular course of study; they can take
small steps in various directions, sampling as they choose. Typical
cases for small steps thus involve a serious risk of unintended bad
consequences because of a disproportion between the paucity or
dearth of information and the magnitude of the decision; hence
reversability is especially important.
On the institutional side, consider lotteries for both jury and
military service. The appeal of a lottery for jury service stems from
the relatively low costs of operating the system and the belief that
any alternative device for allocation would produce more mistakes,
because it would depend on a socially contentious judgment about
who should be serving on juries, with possibly destructive results for
the jury system itself. The key point is that the jury is supposed to be
a cross-section of the community, and a random process seems to be
the best way of serving that goal (as well as the fairest way of
apportioning what many people regard as a social burden). In light
of the purposes of the jury system, alternative allocation methods
would be worse; consider stated willingness to serve, an
individualized inquiry into grounds for excuse, or financial payments
(either to serve or not to serve). For military service, related
judgments are involved, in the form of a belief that any stated criteria
for service might be morally suspect, and hence a belief that random
outcomes produce less in the way of error.32
                                                
32 On ethical and political issues associated with lotteries in general, see Jon
Elster, Solomonic Judgments 36-122 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1993).
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B. Change, Unintended Consequences, and Reversibility
Lotteries involve random processes; small steps do not. We have
said that Anglo-American judges often proceed case-by-case, as a
way of minimizing the burdens of decision and the consequences of
error. In fact many legal cultures embed a kind of norm in favor of
incremental movement. They do this partly because of the
distinctive structure of adjudication and the limited information
available to the judge: in any particular case, a judge will hear from
the parties immediately affected, but little from others whose
interests might be at stake. Hence there is a second-order decision in
favor of small steps.
Suppose, for example, that a court in a case involving a
particular patient seeking a “right to die” finds that it has little
information; if the court attempted to generate a rule that would
cover all imaginable situations in which that right might be
exercised, the case would take a very long time to decide. Perhaps the
burdens of decision would be prohibitive. This might be so because
of a sheer lack of information, or it might be because of the pressures
imposed on a multimember court consisting of people who are
unsure or in disagreement about a range of subjects. Such a court
may have a great deal of difficulty in reaching closure on broad rules.
Small steps are a natural result.
When judges proceed by small steps, they do so precisely because
they know that their rulings create precedents; they want to narrow
the scope of future applications of their rulings given the various
problems described above, most importantly the lack of sufficient
information about future problems. A distinctive problem involves
the possibility of too much information. A particular case may have a
surplus of apparently relevant details, and perhaps future cases will
lack one or more of the relevant features, and this will be the source
of the concern with creating wide precedents. The existence of
(inter alia) features X or Y in case A, missing in case B, makes it
hazardous to generate a rule in case A that would govern case B. The
narrow writing and reception of the Supreme Court’s decision in the
celebrated Amish case, allowing an exemption of Amish children
from mandatory public schooling, is an example.
Small steps can also make special sense if circumstances are
changing rapidly. Perhaps relevant facts and values will change in
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such a way as to make a rule quickly anachronistic even if it is well
suited to present conditions. Thus it is possible that any decision
involving the application of the first amendment to new
communications technologies, including the Internet, should be
narrow, because a broad decision, rendered at this time, would be so
likely to go wrong. On this view, a small step is best because of the
likelihood that a broad rule would be mistaken when applied to cases
not before the court.
In an argument very much in this spirit, Joseph Raz has
connected a kind of small step—the form usually produced by
analogical reasoning—to the special problems created by one-shot
interventions into complex systems.33 In Raz’ view, courts reason by
analogy in order to prevent unintended side-effects from large
disruptions. Similarly supportive of the small-step strategy, the
German psychologist Dietrich Dorner has done some illuminating
computer experiments designed to see whether people can engage in
successful social engineering.34 Participants are asked to solve
problems faced by the inhabitants of some region of the world.
Through the magic of the computer, many policy initiatives are
available to solve the relevant problems (improved care of cattle,
childhood immunization, drilling more wells). But most of the
participants produce eventual calamities, because they do not see the
complex, system-wide effects of particular interventions. Only the
rare participant is able to see a number of steps down the road—to
understand the multiple effects of one-shot interventions on the
system. The successful participants are alert to this risk and take
small, reversible steps, allowing planning to occur over time. Hence
Dorner, along with others focussing on the problems created by
interventions into systems,35 argues in favor of small steps. Judges
face similar problems, and incremental decisions are a good way of
responding to the particular problem of bounded rationality created
by ignorance of possible adverse effects.
From these points we can see that small steps may be better
than rules or than delegation. Often an institution lacks the
                                                
33 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
34 See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure (1994).
35 See James Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998).
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information to generate a clear path for the future; often no
appropriate delegate has that information. If circumstances are
changing rapidly, any rule or presumption might be confounded by
subsequent developments. What is especially important is that
movement in any particular direction should be reversible if problems
arise. On the other hand, a small steps approach embodies a kind of
big (if temporary) decision in favor of the status quo; a court that
tries to handle a problem of discrimination incrementally may allow
unjust practices to continue, and so too with a state that is trying to
alleviate the problem of joblessness in poor areas. A small steps
approach might also undermine planning and fail to provide advance
notice of the content of law or policy. Thus it cannot be said that a
small steps approach is, in the abstract, a rational approach to
bounded rationality36; whether it is a (fully optimal) response to
bounded rationality, or a (suboptimal) reflection of bounded
rationality, depends on the context.
The analysis is similar outside of the governmental setting.
Agents might take small steps because they lack the information
that would enable them to generate a rule or presumption, or
because the decision they face is unique and not likely to be repeated,
so that there is no reason for a rule or a presumption. Or small steps
may follow from the likelihood of change over time, from the fact
that a large decision might have unintended consequences, or from
the wish to avoid or at least to defer the responsibility for large-scale
change.   
                                                
36 In one form or other, small steps are favored in Scott, supra note; Edward
Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 3-15 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1949); Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1962). These discussions fail, however, to notice that there
are circumstances in which a form of High-Low is preferable, as where
advanced planning is necessary; consider the areas of property and contract law,
where a high degree of certainty is extremely important. Thus those who favor
Low-Low tend to share the problem with those who favor High-Low, see
Scalia, supra note; they appear not to see that the virtues and vices of any
particular second-order strategy depend on context and on the competence of
relevant institutions, and cannot rest on a priori arguments.
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Table 2: Second-Order Strategies
Strategies Examples Potential Advantages Potential Disadvantages Appropriate Context
1. low-high:
delegation
spouses, friends;
administrative
agencies
relief from direct
responsibility for
ultimate decisions;
increased chance for
good outcomes
problems relating to trust,
fairness, and
responsibility; possible
high costs in deciding
whether and to whom to
delegate
availability of appropriate and
trustworthy delegate; high
burdens of, or perceived
likelihood of error in,
decision by delegator
2. low-low:
picking, small
steps, various
heuristics
Anglo-American
common law;
lotteries; big
personal
decisions
low overall costs;
reversibility; coping
with change and with
unintended
consequences
difficulty of planning;
high aggregate decision
costs; multiple mistakes
equipoise/ symmetry of
preferences or values;
reasonable aversion to drastic
changes; reasonable fear of
unanticipated consequences
3. high-low:
rules,
presumptions,
routines
speed limit laws;
legal formalism;
criminal law;
recovering
addicts; rigid
people
low costs of numerous
decisions once in
place; uniformity;
facilitates planning
difficulty of generating
good rules or
presumptions; mistakes
once in place
sheer number of anticipated
decisions/ decisionmakers;
repetitive nature of future
decisions; need for planning,
confidence in ability to
generate ex ante decisions
4. high-high certain Henry
James characters;
dysfunctional
governments
none (unless decision
costs are actually
pleasant to incur and
decisions end up being
good)
paralysis; unpopularity;
individual or institutional
collapse
agency or institution cannot
do otherwise
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VI. Summary and Conclusions
A. Second-Order Strategies
The discussion is summarized in Table 2. Recall that the terms
“low” and “high” refer to the overall costs of the decision, which are
not necessarily borne by the same agent: with Low-High the costs
are split between delegator and delegate; with High-Low they may
be split between an institution (which makes the rules, say) and an
agent (who follows the rules).
There are two principal conclusions. The first is that no
second-order strategy can reasonably be preferred in the abstract.
The second is that it is possible to identify the settings in which one
or another is likely to make sense, and also the factors that argue in
favor of, or against, any particular approach.
B. Do People Actually Make Second-Order Decisions? Should They?
There remains an important underlying issue: do people, or
institutions, actually make a self-conscious decision about which
second-order strategy to favor, given the menu of possibilities?
Sometimes this is indeed the case. A legislature may, for
example, deliberate and decide to delegate rather than to generate
rules; a court may choose, self-consciously, to proceed incrementally;
having rejected the alternatives, a President may recommend a
lottery system rather than other alternatives for admitting certain
aliens to the country. An institution or a person may well make an
all-things-considered decision in favor of one or another second-
order strategy.
Sometimes, however, a rapid assessment of the situation takes
place, rather than a full or deliberative weighing of alternative
courses of action. This is often the case in private decisions, where
judgments often seem immediate. Indeed, second-order decisions
might be too costly if they were a product of an optimizing strategy;
so taken, they would present many of the problems of first-order
decisions. As in the case of first-order decisions, it sometimes makes
sense to proceed with what seems best, rather than to maximize in
any systematic fashion, simply because the former way of proceeding
is easier (and thus may maximize once we consider decision costs of
various kinds). For both individuals and institutions, the salient
features of the context usually suggest a particular kind of second-
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order strategy; there is no reason to think long and hard about the
second-order decision.
These are intended as descriptive points about the operation of
practical reason. But there is a normative issue here as well, for
people’s second-order decisions often go wrong. People tend to
make mistakes when they choose strategies a priori; and often they
would do better to be self-conscious and reflective about the diverse
possibilities. For example, legal formalists, most prominently Justice
Antonin Scalia, argue for a High-Low strategy, but they do so
without engaging the pragmatic and empirical issues at stake, and
without showing that this strategy is preferable to the realistic
second-order alternatives.37
The same can be said about those who argue that rules can
promote consequentialism indirectly38 and also those who favor
incrementalism, or small steps, in political or legal reasoning.39
There are many ways of handling decisional burdens, and others
may be better.
Pathologically rigid rules can be a serious problem for law and
policy; the Sentencing Guidelines are often criticized on this
ground, and whether or not the criticism is just, pathological rigidity
is a problem for societies as well as individuals. Sometimes delegation
is a most unfortunate route to travel.
At the political level, and occasionally at the individual level too,
it would be much better to be more explicit and self-conscious about
the various alternatives, so as to ensure that societies and institutions
do not find themselves making bad second-order decisions, or
choosing a second-order strategy without a sense of the candidates.
We have attempted to systematize the underlying considerations
here.
                                                
37 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation pp. 5-24. Schauer sees that the
choice of formalism must be largely based on empirical considerations, but he
does not identify alternative second-order possibilities or show how they might
be compared to rule-bound law.
38 See Johnson. Nothing said here shows that Johnson is wrong; it shows only
that a full defense of using rules as a way of promoting consequentialist goals
would have to grapple with various second-order alternatives (such as
presumptions or standards).
39 See Edward Levi, supra note, at 3-7; Lindblom, supra note.
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C. Rationality and Bounded Rationality
Second-order decisions are often a response to a particular
source of bounded rationality: limited information. As we have
emphasized, second-order strategies are potentially optimal solutions
to the problems posed by unanticipated side-effects and the difficulty
of obtaining knowledge about the future. Or they may respond to an
institution’s awareness that it is prone to use unreliable heuristic
devices when a decision must be made on the spot. In addition,
second-order strategies may be a response to motivational rather
than cognitive problems; people try, for example, to counteract their
own tendencies toward impulsiveness, myopia, and unrealistic
optimism.40 In these ways second-order decisions can be seen as
rational responses by rational actors making those decisions with full
awareness of the costs of obtaining information and of their own
propensities for error.
But of course bounded rationality can affect second-order
decisions as well. When rational actors make second-order decisions
to overcome their own bounded rationality, these decisions may
themselves be made badly, as a result of informational and
motivational problems. A lack of information may press people and
institutions in the direction of suboptimal second-order strategies; an
inadequately informed court, for example, may choose small steps
even though rules would be better. We suspect that the availability
heuristic—by which people make judgments by focusing on similar
cases that come readily to mind—underlies some erroneous
judgments about appropriate second-order strategies.41 Bad second-
order decisions can also be a result of motivational problems. An
impulsive or myopic agent or institution may fail to see the extent to
which rules will be confounded by subsequent developments; an
unrealistically optimistic agent or institution may overestimate its
                                                
40 See Neil Weinstein, “Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health
Problems,” J. Behavioral Medicine 10 (1987): 481-512, for a general
discussion.
41 Cf. Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler, “Case-Based Decision Theory,”
Q. J. Econ. 110 (1995) 605-34; Daniel Kahneman and Don Lovallo, Timid
Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, Mgmt.
Sci. 39 (1993): 17-35.
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capacity to make optimal small steps. Thus people may choose
second-order strategies that badly disserve their own goals, as, for
example, when people rely on heuristic devices that produce
mistakes.42
D. Conclusion
Ordinary people and official institutions are often reluctant to
make on-the-spot decisions; they respond with one or another
second-order strategy. The diverse candidates raise separable ethical
and political problems. Some such strategies involve high initial
burdens but generate a relatively simple, low-burden mechanism for
deciding subsequent cases. These strategies, generally taking the
form of rules or presumptions, are best when the anticipated
decisions are numerous and repetitive and when advance notice and
planning are important.
Other strategies involve both light initial burdens and light
burdens at the time of making the ultimate decision. These
approaches work well when a degree of randomization is appealing
on normative grounds (perhaps because choices are otherwise in
equipoise, or because no one should or will take responsibility for
deliberate decision), or when a first-order decision is simply too
difficult to make (because of the cognitive or emotional burdens
involved in the choice) or includes too many imponderables and a
risk of large unintended consequences. A key point in favor of small
steps involves reversibility.
Still other strategies involve low initial burdens but high,
exported burdens at the time of decision, as when a delegation is
made to another person or institution, or (in a metaphor) to one’s
future self. Delegations take many different forms, with more or less
control retained by the person or institution making the delegation.
Strategies of delegation make sense when a delegate is available who
has relevant expertise (perhaps because he is a specialist) or is
otherwise trustworthy (perhaps because he does not suffer from bias
or some other motivational problem), or when there are special
political, strategic, or other advantages to placing the responsibility
for decision on some other person or institution. Delegations can
                                                
42 See Khong for suggestive examples.
35 Second-Order Decisions
raise serious ethical or political issues and create problems of
unfairness, as when delegates are burdened with tasks that they do
not voluntarily assume, or would not assume under just conditions,
and when the delegation is inconsistent with the social role of the
delegator, such as a legislature or a court. Hence delegations can be
troubling from the point of view of democracy or the separation of
powers.
The final set of cases involve high burdens both before and at
the time of decision, as in certain fictional characters, and in highly
dysfunctional governments. We have merely gestured in the
direction of this strategy, which may make sense under extreme
circumstances, but which generally can be considered best only on
the assumption that bearing high overall burdens of decision is an
affirmative good (perhaps for moral reasons) or even something to
relish. This assumption might appear peculiar, but it undoubtedly
helps explain some otherwise puzzling human behavior—behavior
that often provides the motivation to consider the other, more
promising second-order decisions discussed here.
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